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AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
RECENT PROPOSALS AND AMERICAN
CONCERNS
Timothy C. Everedt
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the current position of the United
States (hereinafter U.S.) toward the proposed international
criminal court. An attempt will be made to discern the main
sources of that position, note the dominant reservations to a
permanent international criminal court and determine whether
existing proposals and draft statutes adequately address Amer-
ican concerns. Existing proposals and solutions, which fail to
address problems attendant on the creation of an international
criminal jurisdiction, give rise to U.S. reservations to the pro-
posed court. An approach will be suggested that may address
some of the unresolved problems noted in recent federal govern-
ment pronouncements.1
t BA in History, University of California at Berkeley. Masters Degree Can-
didate, The Elliott School of International Affairs, George Wahington University.
Research Associate, World Federalist Association, Washington, D.C.
1 See Statement of Jason Abrams, United States Representative to the Sixth
Committee, (Nov. 14, 1989); Statement of John Knox, United States Representa-
tive to the Sixth Committee, (Nov. 9, 1990); Statement of Robert B. Rosenstock,
United States Representative to the Sixth Committee of the Forty-Sixth Session of
the United Nations General Assembly, November 6, 1991, Press Release USUN
82-(91), (Nov. 7,1991); Statement by the Hon. Edwin D. Williamson, United States
Special Advisor to the United Nations General Assembly in the Sixth Committee,
USUN Press Release #113-(92), (Oct. 27, 1992); Report of the Judicial Conference
of the United States on the Feasibility of and the Relationship to the Federal Judici-
ary of an International Criminal Court (hereinafter Judicial Conference Report)
JUD. CONF. OF THE UNrrED STATES (Sept. Sess. 1991); Letter from Janet G. Mullins,
Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to the Hon. Dante B.
Fascell, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, (Dec.
11, 1991) (on file with the author); U.S. Department of State, Report of the United
States on the Draft Code of Crimes, (Jan. 1, 1993); Comments of Governments on
the Report of the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal Ju-
risdiction, U.N. International Law Commission, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/452
(1993).
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After a brief discussion of the background of this proposal,
highlighting its recent progression and contrasting it to the de-
velopment of the Nuremberg war crimes trials, U.S. comment
on the proposals will be identified and reviewed. A considera-
tion of the problems and uncertainties surrounding the pro-
posed court will lead to an overview of recent draft statutes that
may become the basis for a permanent court. The subject mat-
ter and personal jurisdiction of the proposed court will form the
primary concerns of this discussion, which argues for the pur-
suit of a more elaborate and comprehensive approach than that
presently contemplated by the international community. A so-
lution which combines a more effective international criminal
law defining mechanism, democratic principles and acknowl-
edges the enforcement authority and prerogative of the United
Nations Security Council (hereinafter UNSC), may prove a
more appropriate response to transnational crime, acts of ag-
gression and genocide, and breaches of international humanita-
rian law.
The U.S. actively led the creation of the Nuremberg trials,
both during the Second World War and at its close. 2 It also
lends its strong support to the creation of an ad hoc war crimes
tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.3 However, official support
for a permanent international criminal jurisdiction has been no-
tably absent.4 Between 1945 and the end of the cold war, offi-
cial endorsement or suggestion of a permanent court had been
limited due to the perceived threat to national sovereignty im-
plicit in the proposal for a court with compulsory jurisdiction, as
well as pragmatic cognizance of cold war realities.5 New inter-
2 See THE UNrrED NATIONS WAR CRIMEs COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE
UNrrED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMrmssioN (1948).
3 See Don Oberdorfer, Eagleburger Urges Trial of Serb Leaders, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17, 1992, at Al; Letter Dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative
of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25575 (1993); Statement of Madeline K. Albright
in Security Council Establishes International Tribunal to Prosecute Violations of
Humanitarian Law in Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/
5624 (1993); and Statement by US AmbassadorAlbright, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DIS-
PATCH, March 22, 1993, V. 4 No. 12, at 166.
4 Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where
They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLuM. J. TRMSNAeL L. 375, 375-78
(1992).
5 The initial proposal for an international criminal court was frustrated by
the international community's inability to agree on a definition of aggression. See
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national political circumstances, new problems and the leader-
ship of the United Nations (hereinafter UN) may force a
reassessment by the Clinton administration. 6
While the U.S. as a whole has been cautious on the develop-
ment of a permanent court, Congress has expressed its support
for the study of an international criminal jurisdiction.7
Academia, non-governmental organizations and the public have
displayed far more support and interest in the development of a
permanent court than official Washington. These forces may
indicate a greater disposition to rely on international responses
to problems which concern the international community rather
than the views expressed by Representatives to the Sixth Com-
mittee of the UN General Assembly. Specifically, the changing
public perceptions of national sovereignty and greater expecta-
tions of, and demands on, the UN suggest that a more elaborate
multilateral response to the problem of international crime may
be politically viable.
The primary cause of hesitation by national governments to
an international criminal court involves the scope of the court's
jurisdiction. 9 UN Member States are understandably appre-
Ferencz, supra, note 4. The East-West cold war rivalry significantly diminished
the UN's ability to develop a recognized definition of aggression.
6 The recent change in the international climate can be attributed to the
changed leadership and structure of the former Soviet Union. Recent discussion of
a permanent international criminal court has been in relation to international ter-
rorism, drug trafficking, genocide, aggression and violations of human rights.
7 See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 895, 896, § 1201; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4265, § 4104; Amendment 3068 to the Foreign Operations, Ex-
port Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-513, 104 Stat. 2066, § 599E; Persian Gulf War Criminals Act of 1991; and S.J.
Res. 32, 103D Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993), introduced by Senator Dodd, January, 1993.
8 See Statement of Jason Abrams, supra note 1; Statement of John Knox,
supra note 1; Statement of Robert B. Rosenstock, supra note 1; Statement by the
Hon. Edwin D. Williamson, supra note 1; and United States Mission to the United
Nations, Statement by the Hon. Conrad K Harper, Legal Adviser U. S. Dep't of
State and U. S. Rep. to the Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item
143, USUN Press Release 171-(93) (1993).
9 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CnwwAL COURT, A STEP To-
WARD WoLmD PEACE: A DocumErrARY HIsToRY kN ANALYsis 382-390 (1980);
Michael P. Scharf, The Jury Is Still Out on the Need for an International Criminal
Court, 1991 Duicn J. Comp. & INIL L. 135 (1991); World Conference on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Tribunal to Enforce International Criminal
Law and Human Rights, Intl Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Studies
(1992) (hereinafter ISISC Report); INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR CRmmuAL LAw RE-
1994]
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hensive about the uncertainties surrounding the establishment
of a court that might exercise jurisdiction over their nationals.' 0
The risks associated with a court exercising compulsory juris-
diction are closely tied to the court's subject matter jurisdiction
and applicable law. The number of proposed draft statutes con-
tributes to the confusion surrounding the proposal and fuels
concerns related to its potential infringement on national sover-
eignty. Further, significant reservations to the draft Code of
Crimes'1 have called into question its use as a basis for the
court's jurisdiction.
The argument has also been raised that an international
criminal jurisdiction might disrupt or detract from the existing
extradition regime, thus causing damage to the present system
of international criminal law enforcement. 12 At best, the rela-
tionship between the existing system of international criminal
justice and the the proposed court is laden with complex ques-
tions that must be answered before U.S. hesitation turns to sup-
port. At worst, the complexities associated with the proposed
court and its relationship to present transnational systems of
extradition and prosecution may adversely impact current in-
ternational criminal law enforcement mechanisms, regardless
of the court's eventual structure and scope. General agreement
seems to exist in the international community that solutions
can be found to the many complexities associated with an inter-
national criminal court.' 3 The establishment of a permanent
FORM & CRmINAL JUSTICE POLICY, INTERNATIONAL MEETING OF EXPERTS ON THE
EsTABLSH ENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRnmNAL TRmuNAL (1993); Benjamin R.
Civiletti, American Bar Association Reports With Recommendations to the House of
Delegates of the Task Force on an International Criminal Court of the American
Bar Association and of the New York State Bar Association, 1992 A.B.. SEC. INT'L
L. & PRAc. 1; Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Third Session (1991), 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.41L469 (1992) (hereinafter 1992
ILC Report).
l0 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 21-42, U.N. Doc. A/48/10
(1993); and Ferencz, supra note 4, at 376-99.
11 See Report of the United States on the Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 1.
12 See Scharf, supra note 9.
'3 M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court in the International World Order, 25 VA~N. J. TRANSNA TL L.
151 (1992); and 1992 ILC Report, supra note 9.
124 (Vol. 6:121
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court remains a political question, which is dependent upon per-
ceptions of national sovereignty.14
Discussions of the U.S. position regarding the proposed
court are complicated by the diversity of sources expressing that
position, the number of draft statutes circulated in Washington
and internationally, and the lack of detailed and comprehensive
official comment on these statutes. 15 The statutes given consid-
eration by the Member States, the UN, academia, non-govern-
mental organizations, international conferences and meetings
of experts, incorporate different solutions and would establish
an international court with a range of jurisdictional purviews.16
The most recent proposals and discussions intended to address
crimes under international law, however, seem to converge on a
court with limited subject matter and personal jurisdiction.17
Current proposals suggest a court limited by the duration of its
existence, the region under its authority,B and personal and
subject matter jurisdiction dependant on State conferral on a
case by case basis.19
14 See M. CherifBassiouni, The Time has Come for an International Criminal
Court, 1 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 1 (1991).
16 For a historical assessment of the various draft statutes, see FERENCZ,
supra note 9; and TowARD A FEASmLE INTERNATiONAL CnmmNAL COURT (Julius
Stone & Robert K. Woetzel eds., 1970). For a compilation of more recent official
and unofficial proposals, see Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 13. A list of histor-
ical proposals and draft statutes can be found in Report of the Working Group on
the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.475 (1992).
16 See M. CnmmF BAssIoum, DRAFT STATUTE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBu-
NAL 29-46 (1992); 1992 ILC Report supra note 9; and Civiletti, supra note 9.
17 See Steven Masur, Is an International Criminal Court the Answer to Inter-
national Crime? 54 (Feb. 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author);
Col. Eric L. Chase, USMCR, Where Policy, Grand Strategy and Justice Meet: A
War Crimes Court for the New World Order (unpublished manuscript, on file at
the ABA Section on Intl Law); Faiza Patel, Crime Without Frontiers: A Proposal
for an International Narcotics Court, 22 N.Y.U. J. IDTL L. & POL. 709 (1990); Re-
port on the Seminar on a Code of Crimes and Universal Criminal Jurisdiction,
U.N. ESCOR, International Diplomatic Symposium of 1991: The Code of Tallories,
(Robert K. Woetzel, ed., 1991); ISISC Report, supra note 9; INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
FOR CRDmNAL LAw REFORM & CRUMINAL JUSTICE PoLicy, supra note 9.
18 See Report by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, U. N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), concerning a war
crimes tribunal limited to the former Yugoslavia.
19 See BAssrounm, supra note 16; BRYAN F. MAcPHERSON, AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CoURT: APPLYING WoRL LAW To INDIVmuALs, MONOGRAPH No. 10, The
Center For U.N. Reform Education (1992); American Bar Association, Resolution
1994]
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The degree of control ceded to an international court, and
the extent of State obligation to deliver suspects, assistance and
evidence, is of central importance to the success and intended
role of the new court. Although current proposals limit the do-
main of the court, thereby mitigating its potential impact, they
may not comprehensively address the more significant interna-
tional problems the court was originally intended to address. A
more extensive proposal, as outlined below, is based on post-
cold war conceptions of national sovereignty, where the individ-
ual is a primary subject under international law. Such a propo-
sal may better encompass solutions to egregious and significant
breaches of international law committed and sanctioned by na-
tion states and their officials.20
BACKGROUND: NUREMBERG TO NEW YORK VIA THE
COLD WAR21
The leadership of the allied united nations that established
the Nuremberg war crimes trials in response to World War II
aggression, atrocities and genocide, was insufficient to success-
fully create a permanent international criminal jurisdiction in
the early days of the UN.22 Based on initial drafts prepared by
the U.S. Department of Justice,23 the allied nations successfully
indicted, convicted and sentenced the major Axis war
criminals.24 Though criticized by some,25 the Nuremberg trials
Adopted on February 13, 1978 By the House of Delegates of the American Bar Asso-
ciation at New Orleans, Louisiana, 1978 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. 1.
20 The proposed court could thus address aggression, such as that by Iraq
against Kuwait, situations of genocide, as have occurred in the former Yugoslavia,
and Lybian style state sponsored terrorism.
21 This historical background is incomplete; for a more comprehensive
discussion of the history of the proposal for an international criminal court, see
BAsslouNi, supra note 16; Ferencz, supra note 4; Daniel Hill Zafren, An
International Criminal Court? CRS Rep. No. 93-298A, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(revised 1993); John B. Anderson, An International Criminal Court: An Emerging
Idea, 15 NOVA L. REv. 433-47 (1991).
22 Vespasian V. Pella, Towards an International Criminal Court, 44 Ar. J.
INT'L ARm. 37 (1950).
23 See BRADLEY F. Shm, THE ROAD To NUREMBERG (1980), and BRADLEY F.
Sm, REACHING JUDGEmENT AT NUREMERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF How THE
NAZI WAR CRnanNALs WERE JUDGED (1979).
24 See WAR CRMEs AND WAR Cmans TRiALs: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND SOURCE BOOK (Norman Tutorow & Karen Winnovich eds., 1986) (Bibliogra-
phies and Indexes in World History Series No. 4); RoBsT E. CoNoT, JUSTICE AT
NUREMBERG (1984); ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NuRumuRG TRLAL (1984); WER-
(Vol. 6:121
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stand as an important precedent and are hailed, as enunciated
in the Nuremberg Principles,26 as authoritative statements of
individual accountability.27 The post war effort to create a per-
manent international criminal jurisdiction, through the United
Nations International Law Commission (hereinafter Commis-
sion), succumbed to the East-West conflict and the difficulty of
defining aggression.28 UN efforts to establish an international
criminal jurisdiction and a code of international crimes were in-
definitely postponed in 1954, and were given scant official at-
tention until the late 1980's.29
At the initiation of a group of Caribbean Member States,
the General Assembly, in 1989, revitalized the proposal for a
permanent international criminal court in the Commission.30
The Eighth,3 1 Ninth,32 Tenth3 3 and Eleventh 4 reports of the
NER MASER, NuREmBuRG: (A NATION ON TRIAL) (1979); TELFORD TAYLOR, Tim
ANATOmY OF TEn NuREMBERG TIALS (1992).
25 For a critical assessment of the trials, see ARNoLD C. BRAcKcN, THE
OTHER NUREmBuRG: THE UNToLD STORY OF THE ToKYO WAR CR Ms TRIALS (1988).
26 See Affirmation of the Nuremberg Principles of International Law Recog-
nized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add.1 (1947). The International Law Commission subsequently adopted the
Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of Nuremberg and in the
Judgement of the Tribunal, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 12), U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
27 See THE NUREMBERG TRIAl. AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (George Ginsburg &
V.N. Kudriavtsev, eds., 1990); The Rt. Hon. Lord Oaksey, The Nuremberg Trials
and the Progress of International Law (1946-47); Svetlana Pusonjic, The Nurem-
berg Trials and Individual Responsibility for Crimes Against International Law
(1979); Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg Forty Years After: An Introduction, 18 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 261, 267 (1986); and Gerhard Mueller, Four Decades After Nu-
remberg: The Prospect of an International Criminal Code, 2 Coi~m J. h'L L. 499,
504 (1987).
28 On the Commission, see Report of the Committee on the Progressive Develop-
ment of International Law and its Codification, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/332
(1947).
29 GA Res 897, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954);
and GA. Res. 898, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954).
30 See U.N. GAOR. 6th Comm., 44th Sess., 38th-41st mtgs., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
44/SR.38-41 (1989); and Ferencz, supra note 4, at 384-5.
31 Eighth Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. AICN.41430/Add.1 (1990).
See also Draft Report of the Internaional Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.447/Add.1 (1990);
and Draft Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
First Session, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. AICN.4L.4361Add.1 (1989).
32 Ninth Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Topic of the Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. AICN.4t435/Add.1
(1991). See also 1992 ILC Report, supra note 9.
1994]
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Commission's Special Rapporteur on the subject of the Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind con-
sider the question of an international criminal court. The Com-
mission, at its 1992 and 1993 sessions established working
groups on the topic, which have produced two reports.3 5
At its 1992 session, the U.S. representative to the Sixth
Committee argued for a cautious and conservative approach to
the development of an international criminal jurisdiction.3 6
Previous U.S. leadership on the development of the Nuremberg
trials and present support of an ad hoc tribunal for ex-Yugosla-
via, contrasts with recent indifference toward a permanent
court, suggesting the necessity for an examination of the reser-
vations to the proposed court.37 Importantly, without resolu-
tion of the many complexities and problems noted by
Washington, the project may not garner adequate support from
the U.S. or other powerful Member States, and thus may not
have sufficient backing to ensure its establishment and
success.
38
The modern drive to establish an international criminal en-
forcement mechanism can be traced to the endorsement, in a
speech before the UN General Assembly, of an international
criminal court to try drug traffickers by then Soviet President
Gorbachev. 39 The endorsement of such a court, and other inter-
33 U.N. GAOR, supra note 15; and Doudou Thiam, Tenth Report on the Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, International Law
Commission, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/442 (1992).
34 Doudou Thiam, Eleventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, Internaional Law Commission, 44th Sess., para. 8
at 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/449 (1993).
35 U.N. GAOR, supra note 15; Revised Report of the Working Group on the
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.490 (1993).
36 See Statement by the Hon. Edwin D. Williamson, supra note 1.
37 Letter Dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, supra note 3. On
the tribunal, see Report by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Se-
curity Council Resolution 808 (1993), supra note 18. For a discussion of U.S. reser-
vations, see Scharf, supra note 9.
3 See supra note 1. The most significant problems relate to the court's juris-
diction, its relationship to extradition and international criminal law enforcement
systems and the courfs potential conflict with the U.S. Constitution.
39 See Eric Cox, Soviet Union Rediscovers U.N. (So Does U.S.), N.Y. TIMus,
July 13, 1988, at A24; Darrel P. Hammer, Soviet Union Rediscovers U.N. (So Does
U.S.); A Step Backwards, N.Y. Tmms, July 13, 1988, at A24.
[Vol. 6:121
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national legal projects and principles by the former Soviet
Union made possible the serious consideration of an interna-
tional criminal court. Though the issue is again on the interna-
tional agenda, the U.S. has remained cautious and indifferent
to a permanent court, and has offered, or stated support for,
proposals that would limit the court's jurisdiction and effect.40
The causes of this reserved approach are of significant impor-
tance to the success of the project.
THE U.S. PosrrioN TOWARD AN ImTRNATIONAL
CREMNAL COURT
Four main sources of the U.S. position have made official
and unofficial comment on an international criminal jurisdic-
tion. First, the executive branch and Congress have offered a
variety of opinions regarding the proposed court, with Congress
expressing greater, although limited, support for the project.41
Second, international legal professionals and academics have
given considerable attention to, and in some instances spirited
support for, a permanent court.42 They have expressed a
greater willingness to explore the proposal than officials in the
federal government. Third, non-governmental organizations
have been active in the advocacy and consideration of an inter-
national criminal jurisdiction, as well as in the education of citi-
zens, lobbying of governmental officials and sponsoring of
conferences and publication.43 Fourth, the American public,
while not sufficiently aware of the proposals at the UN,44 has
40 See Charles Bataglia, Chronology of Contemporary U.S. Positions on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INL & CoMP. L. REv. 39
(1991).
41 On the executive branch's position and reservations see supra note 1. On
Congress, see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
42 The consistent efforts of Bassiouni, Ferencz, Murphy, Woetzel and many
others have pushed the project to its present state of development. See infra note
56.
43 The Foundation for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
Parliamentarians for Global Action, the World Federalist Association, the Cam-
paign for UN Reform, the Center for Development of International Law, the Amer-
ican and New York State Bar Associations, Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists have been especially active in this regard.
44 There is little coverage of initiatives before the Commission in the national
press. While the Yugoslavian crisis and the recently established ad hoc war crimes
tribunal have generated deserved coverage, the work on a draft code of crimes and
permanent international criminal court have received less attention and delibera-
1291994]
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expressed support for the creation of an international mecha-
nism to hold heads of state and international criminals account-
able for acts which concern the international community. The
existence of this sentiment, combined with a new Administra-
tion and less acrimonious international relations, may cause a
review of the U.S. approach at the UN. Regardless of changes
in national and international political circumstances, the many
unresolved and complex issues identified by recent U.S. state-
ments concerning the court require significant attention and
resolution.
On a number of occasions in the past decade, Congress has
expressed support for a permanent international criminal
court.45 In reaction to political and drug related terrorism, and
as part of a broader legal response to international aggression
and genocide, a series of "sense of Congress" bills have been
passed, as well as legislation refering to the need to study an
international criminal court.46 While this legislation suggests a
measure of support for the consideration of the proposed court,
it can neither be construed as an outright endorsement of a per-
manent court, nor any specific conception or formulation of the
court. This legislation pays little attention to the nuances of
various specific proposals for an international criminal court,
and provides only an indirect indication of the level of support
for the actual establishment of a permanent court. The primary
proponents of the proposed court have been Representative
Leach47 and Senators Specter48 and Dodd.49
Though the proponents have been more vocal and eloquent
than the court's detractors, opposition to the creation of a crimi-
nal court which transcends the jurisdiction of the U.S. has been
tion. "A number of panelists, from parliaments in both the North and the South,
noted the limited public debate to date in their countries." ISISC Report, supra
note 9, at 21.
45 See generally supra note 7.
46 See generally supra note 7.
47 See CONGRESSmAN JAmEs A. LEACH & PROFESSOR M. CHERnw BASSIoUNI,
PARLL4MNTARAMNS FOR GLOBAL ACTION, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 1, AN INTERNA-
TIoNAL CRImAL COURT 1992.
48 See 136 CONG. REc. 77, S8080 (daily ed. June 18, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter).
49 See STATEmENT OF SENATOR Cmus DODD AT TBE FOREIGN RELATIONS COM-
MWTTEE HEARING ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRUMINAL COURT, (May 12, 1993); and 139
CONG. REc. 10 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
[Vol. 6:121
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voiced by elected officials and federal government representa-
lives in hearings and testimony related to the legislation noted
above.60 Concerns generally converge around issues of due pro-
cess, the need to ensure fair trials, threats to national sover-
eignty, the danger of judges from foreign and alien judicial
systems convicting American citizens, and unresolved problems
related to the court's structure. The most significant objections
to a permanent court involve the uncertainties and potential
abuse of authority associated with a court which has been
granted compulsory or exclusive jurisdiction, the potential det-
rimental effects of the court, and concern for wasted resources.
Like the legislation itself, hearings on this topic have lacked
consideration for specific proposals or problems associated with
the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, and are
thus poor indications of Congress' preference for certain formu-
lations of the proposed court. However, two threshold issues
are the need to ensure that the court will not become politicized,
and the extent of the court's jurisdiction.
More specific, yet incomplete, consideration has been given
to these proposals by officials in the executive branch.51 As
mandated by Congress, 52 the Judicial Conference submitted a
report on the proposed court that outlines specific concerns and
gives consideration to some of the solutions offered by interna-
tional legal scholars and the Commission.5 3 The focus of this
report is the court's relationship to the federal judiciary, and it
echoes the caution noted in statements by members of the U.S.
delegation to the UN speaking in the Sixth Committee.54 This
report, the statements of the U.S. representative to the UN
General Assembly's Sixth Committee and Department of State
comments on the proposed court and draft Code of Crimes forms
the most substantial indication of official U.S. reservations to
50 See TESTImONY OF EDwIN D. Wn.uIAMSON BEFORE THE CON=rrEE ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS OF THm UNrrED STATES SENATE (May 12, 1993).
51 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 1; and Comments of Governments on
the Report of the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal Ju-
risdiction, supra note 1.
52 Pub. L. No. 101-513, supra note 7.
63 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 1, at 3, which considered the ILC's
1953 draft statute; Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
64 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 1; and supra note 8.
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the court.55 The problems identified by the executive branch
are further elaborated by academic and legal writers and com-
prise the basis for this discussion.56
While the public, international legal scholars and non- gov-
ernmental organizations show greater support for the proposal
to create an international criminal jurisdiction, as expressed in
a limited fashion by Congressional actions, the federal govern-
ment has appeared less enamored of the project.57 In response
to progress at the UN, crises such as ex-Yugoslavia and
Somalia, and the expected review of a new Administration, the
U.S. may exhibit less indifference to the project and greater
willingness to resolve the specific problems associated with ex-
isting draft statutes. The official U.S. position, indicated by the
above mentioned sources, has been cautiously indifferent to the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court.
Limited endorsement has been suggested for further explora-
tion of the idea, as well as for the creation of a court with re-
stricted jurisdiction, authority and resources.
The formation of a permanent court based on indifference,
pessimism and a restricted approach, however, may neither re-
solve the problems that led to initial calls for an international
56 The U. S. outlines three major principles that it suggests should guide the
development of the proposed court:
First, the development and implementation of such a tribunal should
further, not harm, international law enforcement efforts. This is of particu-
lar concern in the case of narco-trafficers and terrorists. Second, such a
court should be fashioned so as to minimize the potential for politicization of
any sort. Finally, and fundamentally, it is imperative to make sure that the
applicable law, rules of procedure and evidence, and appeal are adequately
addressed in a realistic, just and workable fashion.
Comments of Governments on the Report of the Working Group on the Question of
an International Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 27.
66 See Scharf, supra note 9; Masur, supra note 17; Chase, supra note 17; Peter
Weigend, How Would Conceptual Differences Among Different Systems of Crimi-
nal Justice Impact on the Structure and Procedure of an International Criminal
Court? (unpublished manuscript on file at the ABA Section on International Law);
Peter Wilkitzki, Transfer of the Accused to Court: Mutual Assistance (unpub-
lished manuscript on file at the ABA Section on International Law); Bassiouni &
Blakesley, supra note 13; MACPHERSON, supra note 19; Patel, supra note 17; Bas-
siouni, supra note 14; Ferencz, supra note 4; Nanette Dumas, Enforcement of
Human Rights Standards: An International Human Rights Court and Other Pro-
posals, 13 HAsTiNGs IN'L & Comp. L. REv. 585 (1990); Sharon A. Williams & Hugo
Caminos, An International Criminal Court: Structure and Composition- the Op-
tions, (unpublished manuscript on file at the ABA Section on International Law).
57 Supra notes 46 and 50.
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criminal court, nor allay concerns noted by the U.S. A more
comprehensive approach, incorporating compulsory jurisdiction
and democratic principles, tied to the authority of the Security
Council, may better address individual criminal actions of con-
cern to the international community, and resolve the complexi-
ties associated with the creation of a permanent court.
U.S. RESERVATIONS TO THE PROPOSED COURT
Though the formation of a clear position on the proposed
court has been complicated by the existence of multiple draft
statutes and incomplete deliberations 58 on the subject, a
number of themes can be noted. The first and most significant
concerns the courts personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
The scope of the proposed court's jurisdiction raises important
political questions relating to national sovereignty, the separa-
tion of international and national authority and the proposed
court's interaction with national courts. The second area of
complexity involves the relationship of the court to existing sys-
tems of international criminal extradition and prosecution.
Concern has been expressed that the proposed court might dis-
rupt or detract from existing mechanisms of international coop-
eration.59 Third, the structure of the proposed court, as well as
the procedural and evidentiary rules, are still open questions
which create concerns for due process and judicial protections.
The eventual structure of the court, the scope of its jurisdiction
and its procedural rules will be of significance in resolving con-
cerns related to the court's impartiality.60 The cost of the
court's facilities and bureaucracy, which depend on the court's
form and scale, is also an issue of controversy. Finally, rudi-
mentary philosophical reservations exist in the creation of an
international criminal authority. 61
58 The Judicial Conference Report, supra note 1, at 12 notes, 'he existence of
these unanswered questions... makes it difficult for judges and lawyers concerned
with the practical workings of the judicial system to reach a clear position on the
feasibility or wisdom of establishing an International Criminal Court."
69 See Judicial Conference Report, supra note 1; Scharf, supra note 9; and
Comments of Governments on the Report of the Working Group on the Question of
an International Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 15.
60 See Statement of Robert B. Rosenstock, supra note 1, at 3; and Letter from
Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to
the Hon. Dan Quayle, President of the Senate, at 2 (Oct. 1991).
61 Supra notes 46 and 50.
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While the above areas of apprehension deserve considera-
tion, and would benefit from further definition, the potential
scope of the court's jurisdiction forms the primary interest here.
A consideration of the uncertainties surrounding the court's ju-
risdiction will lead to an assessment of currently proposed
drafts. The central question of this discussion remains: Do re-
cent draft statutes address American concerns relating to the
establishment of a permanent court? Additionally, will the un-
derlying approach of recent draft statutes address these
concerns?
The American Bar Association Report of August 1992 notes
four possible conceptions for the courts jurisdictional scope and
nature62 including "... . (1) exclusive; (2) concurrent; (3) transfer
of proceedings...; or (4) appellate review jurisdiction."63 With
this as a starting point, it is clear that recent U.S. statements
on an international criminal jurisdiction suggest support for a
permanent court with limited, concurrent jurisdiction."
The proposed court's jurisdiction may be conceptually lim-
ited in the following respects. First, an international criminal
court might be regionally limited, similar to the manner in
which the War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 63 and
the Nuremberg trials have been. Second, a court may be re-
stricted temporally, to address a specific incident, conflict or pe-
riod. Third, a permanent court's subject matter jurisdiction
could be restricted to certain crimes or categories of crime.
Lastly, an international criminal court's authority could be lim-
ited in relation to national court jurisdiction, and be
subordinate to the primacy of domestic courts. In this last in-
stance, the international court might gain cognizance over a
case by ceded jurisdiction, at the will and agreement of States
Parties with original jurisdiction over an accused. While the
first, second and third options in this list describe the ad hoc
tribunal recently established for the former Yugoslavia, the pro-
posals for a permanent court, as well as U.S. preferences, ap-
62 Civiletti, supra note 9, at I(A.B-. Report).
63 Civiletti, supra note 9, at 10(A.BA. Report).
64 See supra note 32, devoted to the question of the court's jurisdiction.
65 For Art. VII of the tribunal's statute, see Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, supra note 18, at 18.
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pear to suggest a court limited in the third and fourth respects,
by its subject matter and personal jurisdictional authority.
The 1978 Report of the American Bar Association argues
for a court with jurisdiction limited solely to crimes associated
with acts of terrorism. 66 The type of court recommended by this
report, which was authored during a period of heightened ter-
rorist activity,67 would have exercised concurrent jurisdiction
over individuals accused of criminal acts described in existing
international treaties. This limited approach, which would
lessen the court's perceived infringement of national sover-
eignty by denying the court jurisdiction over State sanctioned
crimes such as aggression, genocide and violations of human
rights, it was hoped would have generated enough State sup-
port to allow for the court's establishment. In contrast to the
1951 and 1953 Commission draft statutes, the 1978 ABA Re-
port attempted to accommodate perceived concern for national
sovereignty and establish a court that would have encompassed
subject matter widely viewed as criminal under international
law. 68
More recent proposals have been in response to interna-
tional drug trafficking and related violence that has eluded so-
lution by individual nations and the international community,
or which has threatened the security or stability of a State or
region. 69 Accordingly, the call for an international criminal ju-
risdiction to address large-scale drug trafficking and drug re-
lated violence has come from States threatened by powerful
drug cartels. 70 In parallel, a court with jurisdiction limited to
international organized crime related to illicit drug trafficking
was advocated in the U.S.71 A symposium called by Senator
Spector, in 1990, recommended a regional criminal court lim-
ited to crimes related to illicit drug trafficking in the Ameri-
66 See supra note 19.
67 See JAMEs P. WooTrN, TEaaomsM: U.S. PoucY OPTIONS, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE IssuE BRIEF, at 12 (1992).
68 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 1, at 3; Ferencz, supra note 4; and
Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 9th
Sess., Supp. No. 12 at 1, U.N. Doc. A/264 (1954), reprinted in FEEENcz, supra note
9.
69 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 55.
71 See Arlen Specter, A World Court for Terrorists, N.Y. Tnuds, July 9, 1989,
at § 4, p. 27.
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cas.72 A regional court that would function in relation to the
Organization of American States, 73 proposed partially in re-
sponse to drug trafficking, remains a subject of study.
The question of a permanent court has most recently been
raised in the context of acts of state aggression, internal con-
flicts, and state sanctioned repression and genocide. In re-
sponse to Iraqi actions in the Persian Gulf,74 the question of an
international criminal court or universal war crimes tribunal
was subsumed by discussions of the trial of Saddam Hussein.
Similarly, the recent events in the former Yugoslavia have sug-
gested the need for international responses to internal strife,
acts of genocide and war crimes. Both these situations led to
calls for an international legal response to address the problems
associated with fractured, failed or aggressive States and their
leaders. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has become inter-
nationalized, and has allowed the UN to act by creating a war
crimes tribunal with jurisdiction over Yugoslavian parties to
the conflict.75 Both situations suggest greater interest on the
part of the world community in international responses that
may infringe upon national jurisdiction and narrow conceptions
of state sovereignty.
U.S. reservations argue for a court with limited authority
that would exercise jurisdiction over a specified area, certain
crimes, or address an existing crisis or circumstance. In addi-
tion to reservations related to the court's jurisdiction, there ex-
ist a number of fundamental issues that deserve identification
and incorporation into the courts establishing instrument.
Among them are due process, presumption of innocence, right to
an attorney, the court's rules of evidence and procedure, and
double jeopardy protections. Additionally, the proposed court
raises important questions relating to the court's interaction
with the existing extradition regime and national constitutions.
It has been cautioned that a new international court might un-
dermine existing systems of international cooperation in crimi-
nal matters, or divert resources from other important efforts to
72 See supra note 48.
73 1992 ILC Report, supra note 9.
74 Acts of aggression and war crimes against Kuwait.
75 U.N. Security Council Adopts Resolution 827 on War Crimes Tribunal, U.S.
DEP'T op STATE DISPATCH, June 7, 1993, V. 4, No. 23, at 417.
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control international crime.76 Beyond these issues lie questions
of the court's personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which
will require significant attention. These questions, and the fear
that the court could become politicized and fail to exercise
proper impartiality, form the most significant bases for contro-
versy surrounding the establishment of a permanent interna-
tional criminal court.
Finally, the philosophical and emotional objections to a per-
manent international criminal court deserve note. Though
these issues form the most intransigent opposition to the pro-
posed court, some of which are avoided in the literature on this
topic, they are seldom resolved to the degree that allows univer-
sal support for the exploration of a permanent court. Signifi-
cant concerns have been noted that judges on a permanent
court may neither be philosophically nor religiously suited to
try American citizens.77
RECENT PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRnmNAL COURT
Over the last half century, a number of draft statutes for an
international criminal court have been considered. The most
recent proposals will be entertained here.78 In essence, the ju-
risdictional purview they incorporate reflects perceived Ameri-
can concern for national sovereignty and the relationship
between the court and national legal systems. This limited ap-
proach, however, is based on the assumption that States are un-
willing to yield sovereignty. The desire to address certain and
limited international criminal behavior is not without unan-
76 Statement by the Hon. Edwin D. Williamson, supra note 1; and Comments
of Governments on the Report of the Working Group on the Question of an Interna-
tional Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1.
77 However, Mueller notes that "[b]y participating in the creation of a system
of international criminal justice, the United States is not subjecting itself to the
will of an alien system. Rather, it is joining in a system which incorporates com-
mon values." Mueller, supra note 27, at 504.
78 This discussion was written before the release of the Commission's most
recent report, Revised Report of the Working Group on the Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court, Addendum, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. At
CN.41L.490/Add.1 (1993). This report includes a draft statute that is somewhat
different and more complete than the Commission's previous statute considered
here. Reference will be made to this more current statute in the notes to this sec-
tion. The discussion herein is largely based on the statute prepared by the Special
Rapporteur in advance of the Commission's 1993 session, found in Thiam, supra
note 34.
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swered and complex questions, and poses some risk to the pres-
ent system of international criminal law enforcement. It is
argued here that, given these risks and the limited categories of
criminal activity under the court's purview, the establishment
of a court based on current proposals may not address the need
for an international criminal court or American reservations.
Upon review of recent proposals and reports relating to the
establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction, it will
be argued that the U.S., and the international community,
would be better served by the creation of an organizational
mechanism that addresses both the absence of an effective and
swift system of international criminal law definition, and the
lack of enforcement for existing international humanitarian law
that applies to acts of state. Additionally, a permanent court
with adequate jurisdiction could contribute to the enforcement
of the UN Charter's prohibitions on the use of force in interna-
tional relations. 79
The UN International Law Commission has been the pri-
mary venue for the elaboration of a statute for an international
criminal court. As well, considerable attention has been devoted
to this project by international legal scholars. In 1992, Profes-
sor M. Cherif Bassiouni published a revised version of the draft
statute he had originally prepared and circulated in 1980.80
Also in 1992, a draft statute prepared by Bryan MacPherson
was published by the Center for United Nations Reform Educa-
tion.8 ' Both of these documents, and a more recent draft stat-
ute prepared in advance of the Commission's 1993 session, 2
represent conceptions of a permanent court conditioned by as-
sumptions relating to national sovereignty, cost and the widely
accepted conclusion that an evolutionary approach is desirable.
These proposals raise a number of complex technical questions,
yet may fail to address the most egregious violations of interna-
tional criminal law and the concerns of the international
community.
79 U.N. Charter Art. 2 para. 4. The court could also settle questions of individ-
ual liability in situations where the inherent right of self-defense, under article 51,
is abused as a justification for aggression.
80 See BAssioum, supra note 16.
81 See MAcPHERsON, supra note 19, at 51-70.
82 Thiam, supra note 33.
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The MacPherson draft calls for a court with limited juris-
diction, created by statute, that would be given authority to try
cases by subsequent agreement. 83 The court would remain in-
active and dormant unless and until a State party to the court's
statute ceded a case for adjudication.84 This conception of the
court's jurisdiction excludes any significant state obligation to
yield to the court's authority. The proposal thus incorporates
concurrent and optional, as opposed to compulsory or exclusive
jurisdiction. This approach parallels the direction suggested by
the Commission in the 1992 report of its Working Group. 85
Bassiouni incorporates a solution to the problem of the
court's substantive, applicable law in a similar manner by a sys-
tem of transferred jurisdiction.8, In this conception the court
would merely be an extension of States' Parties jurisdiction, and
would apply the transferring State's criminal law and rules of
procedure. Again, however, the court's authority would largely
depend on the consent of States to transfer the proceedings of a
case involving a crime recognized under international law, and
thus under the court's purview. 87 This approach might address
perceived State concerns related to the infringement of national
sovereignty, and fears that the accused would be tried by an
alien system of criminal law, but it has been criticized, as have
other draft statutes, for running afoul of the current extradition
regime and national constitutional mandates. Importantly, it
has been noted that this system might conflict with Article III,
and the fifth and sixth amendments to the U.S. constitution.88
The U.S. has accordingly expressed its reservation to such an
83 Thiam, supra note 33, at 11, para. 52.
84 Thiam, supra note 33, at 11, para. 52.
85 See 1992 ILC Report, supra note 9, para. 35-86.
86 BAssroum, supra note 16.
87 BAssiou, supra note 16. Bassiouni's draft calls for jurisdiction to be ceded
on a case by case basis or by annexed agreement over specified crimes. Acceptance
of the statute does not automatically bring State parties under the courts jurisdic-
tion. While this approach allows States the flexibility to accede to the court's juris-
diction at State convenience, compulsory jurisdiction is not an essential part of the
court's statute.
88 See Judicial Conference Report, supra note 1, at 11-14; and Comments of
Governments on the Report of the Working Group on the Question of an Interna-
tional Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1.
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approach.8 9 Regardless of the means of triggering the court's ju-
risdiction in this approach, the fundamental implications of
State acceptance of the court's authority on a case by case basis
yields a court with limited power and efficacy.
These two drafts indicate the apparent direction and ap-
proach that has emerged in the'academic and international
legal community, as well as in the Commission. With previous
recommendations for a limited court as a basis,90 the predomi-
nance of recent proposals argue for restricted and compromise
jurisdiction. The argument in support of this approach relies on
the assertion that States will refuse to give the court compul-
sory jurisdiction as this would require them to yield sover-
eignty. Thus, the establishment of a limited court, which may
successfully settle non-controversial cases, thereby gaining
credibility and recognition, would improve the present system
of international criminal law prosecution and perhaps, in time,
develop into a more potent institution. This assertion is based
on two potentially fallacious assumptions. The first assump-
tion, as previously mentioned, is that states will not submit to
an extranational entity exercising compulsory authority. The
second is that a limited court, requiring case by case cessession
of jurisdiction, will develop gradually into a more powerful and
accepted court, and thereby address the more significant inter-
national criminal problems it was originally intended to resolve.
These assumptions are considered in the following section.
A recently completed Commission draft statute,91 which
was considered by the Commission at its forty-fifth session, will
form the basis of the following discussion. Similar to the above
mentioned unofficial draft statutes, this proposal of the Com-
mission's Special Rapporteur rests on analogous assumptions
regarding State willingness to accede to a convention which
would grant a permanent court wide authority. This Commis-
sion draft therefore incorporates a system of ceded jurisdiction.
The court would require the approval of the State of which the
89 See Judicial Conference Report, supra note 1, at 11-14; Comments of Gov-
ernments on the Report of the Working Group on the Question of an International
Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1.
90 See American Bar Association, supra note 19; and Patel, supra note 17.
91 The Special Rapporteur's draft, prepared in advance of the Commission's
forty-fifth session, is found in Thiam, supra note 34. The statute is reprinted with
commentary and a brief introduction by the Rapporteur.
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accused is a national, as well as the State possessing territorial
jurisdiction.92 This system of concurrent jurisdiction,93 and the
means of State recognition of the court's authority to initiate
proceedings, does not differ greatly in principle from proposals
offered by the academic community and in discussions in the
U.S.94 Whereas previous proposals require the approval of mul-
tiple States that may have reason to assert jurisdiction over an
accused, the Commission's proposal would limit the number of
States necessary for the court to exercise authority to two.95
The procedure by which States submit cases and accede to
the court's jurisdiction is of paramount importance to the
coures degree of authority. Specifically, does rendition of an in-
dividual from a State which holds custody of an accused who
had committed a crime in a different State, both of which had
acceded to the court's jurisdiction, automatically establish the
court's authority? The statute is silent on the procedure
through which the court gains jurisdiction, and fails to specify
92 The draft is not explicit about the procedure by which jurisdiction is ceded
to the court in a given case. Jurisdiction may be either automatic upon custody by
the court of an accused whose State of nationality and the State in which the crime
occurred are each a party to the court's statute or it may require the further agree-
ment of both of these States, thereby reserving the right to withhold recognition of
the court's jurisdiction. The Rapporteur's commentary indicates the latter, more
restricted approach. Thiam, supra note 34. The Commission's more recent statute
outlines, in Article 23, U.N. GAOR, supra note 78, at 23, three possible arrange-
ments by which states might cede jurisdiction to the court, for the General Assem-
bly to consider at its current session. Article 27 of the more recent statute foresees
a role for the UNSC in situations of aggression. U.N. GAOR, supra note 78, at 31.
93 Article 23 of the Commission's draft statute thus reads "... . [para.] 2. (a)
Any state... may, instead of having an accused person tried under its own jurisdic-
tion, refer him to the court." U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 24, para. 93, art 23
(2Xa). The commentary notes that "paragraph 2, subparagraph (a), establishes the
optional and concurrent character of the court in that any state also has the right
to have an accused person tried under its own jurisdiction." U.N. GAOR, supra
note 34, at 24, para. 96. Paragraph 3 of this article states that "on receiving the
complaint, the President of the court shall, provided the states are not complain-
ants, inform the state accordingly on whose territory the offence was committed
and the state of which the accused is a national." U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at
24, para. 93, art. 23(3). There is unclear indication that the word "inform7 implies
required consent to initiate proceedings. However, State approval on a case by
case basis is clearly suggested by the Rapporteur's commentary.
94 BAssioum, supra note 16; MAcPHERSON, supra note 19; and American Bar
Assoication, supra note 19.
95 U.N. GAOR, supra note 34. The introduction thus reads"... [the court's
jurisdiction] depends on the consent of two States: the complainant State and the
State of the territory of the crime." U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 7, para. 11.
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the nature of the court's obligation to receive approval from
States with national or territorial jurisdiction. Though a State
must refer a case in order for the court to exercise its jurisdic-
tion, the Rapporteur's draft statute fails to address the proce-
dures for submission of cases and the boundaries of the court's
authority in the absence of direction from States holding pri-
mary jurisdiction over an alleged criminal.
Apparently, if an accused is the subject of domestic pro-
ceedings that have already been initiated, the proposed court
would have no authority or jurisdiction. Under the Rap-
porteur's draft, if a State were exercising its jurisdiction based
on national or territorial authority, the court would not super-
sede that authority.9 6 The statute does not, however, make ex-
plicit whether the court requires the prior and immediate
consent of States to exercise jurisdiction, though this would
seem implied in the wording of the draft and commentary.
States, rather than individuals and international organizations,
would initiate a complaint, and would furnish the prosecutorial
resources.97 Thus, the court requires the immediate action of at
least one state.98
The Rapporteur's draft statute offers no provisions for
States parties to renounce the court's jurisdiction once it is in-
voked or acceded to through ratification of the court's establish-
ing Convention. However, Article 24 does allow that "any
concerned State may intervene in the criminal procedure, sub-
96 Supra notes 93 and 95.
97 U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 25, proposes two options. The first, accord-
ing to the Rapporteur's comments, garnered the predominant support of the Com-
mission, and calls for States to conduct the prosecution. The second, which the
Rapporteur suggests the Commission does not prefer, calls for a Prosecutor Gen-
eral to be appointed from among the General Assembly of Judges to conduct prose-
cutions on behalf of the complainant State.
98 U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 24. Article 23 thus reads "A case shall be
submitted to the court on the complaint of a State." U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at
24, para. 93, art. 23(1). The commentary notes, "Paragraph 1 restricts the right of
complaint to States. Accordingly, individuals and international organizations are
excluded from this right." U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 24, para. 94. This provi-
sion further reduces the possibility that heads of State or governmental officials
will be called to the proposed court to answer for crimes against domestic publics.
Article 29 of the Commission's more recent draft would similarly limit the submis-
sion of complaints to states, but would include the Security Council as a possible
complainant. U.N. GAOR, supra note 78, at 2.
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mit a memoranda and take part in the proceedings." 99 It is sig-
nificant to note, according to Article 6, that once the court is
engaged on a case, it would "rule on questions relating to its
own jurisdiction in a case submitted to it."100 In situations of
third State rendition, the court would appear to possess a de-
fault jurisdiction, presuming a State party exercising national
or territorial jurisdiction did not invoke its authority previously.
Where custody is held by a State with national or territorial ju-
risdiction over an alleged criminal, the court would rely entirely
on State referral.
In addition, the draft makes no provision for the interna-
tional court to review national proceedings against violations of
international criminal law. Furthermore, it apparently would
not allow the proposed court to exercise jurisdiction where a
State with national or territorial authority had failed or refused
to try the accused, and had not referred the case to the interna-
tional criminal court.' 0 ' The statute does not mention the prob-
lem of double jeopardy.' 0 2 The enunciation of this interaction
with national courts and the authority of the international
court to rule on a case previously considered at the national
level, or vice versa, has significant implications for the author-
ity and jurisdiction of the proposed court. The authority to pur-
sue an alleged criminal who has been aquitted or granted
amnesty by a national proceeding must be resolved and is of
99 U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 25, para. 98, art. 24.
100 U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 13. The commentary to Article 6 notes that
. the judge hearing a dispute shall also be the judge of its own jurisdiction."
U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 13, para. 49.
101 Supra notes 92, 93 and 97.
102 U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 13. Article 7 outlines the judicial guarantees
afforded defendants, but does not specifically include protection against double
hearings. The commentary to Article 7 refers to a number of international human
rights instruments, some of which include protection against double hearings, but
fails to specifically incorporate this provision or address the relationship between
national court rulings and the proposed international court. Article 45 of the Com-
mission's more recent statute makes explicit the proposed court's authority to retry
or review cases concluded by national courts. It provides protections and allows
the court to review and retry cases previously concluded at the national level. U.N.
GAOR, supra note 78, at 24. For a discussion of the double jeopardy problem in
the Draft Code of Crimes, see commentary of Bert Swart in ComwmETARms oN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAw CoMMussION's 1991 DAFT CoDE op CRIMEs AGAINsT THE
PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND 173-85 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 1993).
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paramount importance to the extent of the proposed court's
jurisdiction. 0 3
The central requirement that States must provide subse-
quent approval or referral, beyond ratification of the court's
statute, limits the court's authority. This approach is indicated
in the draft statute and introduction to the Special Rapporteur's
report, which notes, "... provision is made for a simplified rule
of handing over the defendant to the court on its simple request,
with, however, reservations implying respect for certain princi-
ples."10 4 Thus, while the specific procedures by which the court
will gain jurisdiction are left incomplete in the Rapporteur's
proposal, the draft statute, with regard to personal jurisdiction,
reflects perceived concerns relating to national sovereignty by
requiring State approval to initiate proceedings.' 0 5 It would
therefore seem to address and mitigate the complexities and
problems outlined in recent U.S. statements toward the pro-
posed court.
While limited jurisdiction would tend to decrease the im-
pact of the court's imperfections and complexities, a number of
concerns require attention regardless of the court's authority.
Specifically, problems that might be amplified in a court with
extensive jurisdiction could still exist and plague a court with
limited, concurrent or optional jurisdiction. The creation of a
court with limited authority presents itself as an attractive, yet
possibly false, solution to the risks apprehended by the creation
of a permanent court.
With regard to potential complications and unresolved is-
sues, two approaches emerge from a consideration of the court's
103 As Professor Thomas Buergenthal noted recently before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee,
The decision of the Salvadoran Government to immediately amnesty all
the individuals who were named by the Truth Commission as responsible
for major acts of violence illustrates once again why national remedies alone
will seldom serve as effective deterrents. Other countries come to mind -
Chile, Nicaragua, Cambodia, to name but a few - where powerful groups
responsible for violations of human rights under a previous government
were able to negotiate or force amnesties or other forms of protection for
themselves.
TESTIMONY BY PROFESSOR THOMAS BUERGENTHAL BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS COMMrrTEE, at 2 (May 12, 1993).
104 Thiam, supra note 34, at 8, para. 18. In situations involving States not
parties to the statute, extradition proceedings would be required.
105 Thiam, supra note 34, at 8, para. 18.
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jurisdiction. The first, if one concludes the complexities associ-
ated with a permanent court are insurmountable,' °6 argues
that the jurisdiction of the court must necessarily be limited, if
it is to exist at all. Conversely, if the unresolved complexities
and concerns attendant on the creation of an international
criminal jurisdiction are considered resolvable, then there is the
potential for adequate support for a permanent international
court with the authority and power to sanction state sponsored
crimes and violations of human rights. Thus, an assessment of
the Rapporteur's approach to a number of outstanding problems
and structural aspects of the court is necessary in order to iden-
tify those items that can be resolved. This may allow the explo-
ration of a court with wider authority over problems of
significant concern to the international community.
One important concern, raised in the U.S. and elsewhere, is
the danger of the politicization of the court.10 7 A number of offi-
cials have expressed apprehension that proceedings might be
initiated for political reasons, and have voiced concern that
judges from alien legal systems or adversarial countries will sit
in judgement of their nationals.' 08 The Commission's draft
statute addresses this issue by allowing States parties the right
to certify, before handing over an accused, that trials are not
pursued for political reasons.10 9 While offering a convenient
and plausible solution for the danger that the court may become
politicized, this provision significantly undermines the author-
ity of the court. States parties are allowed to disregard the
court's jurisdiction if they determine that a case is politically
charged." 0 The prerogative to make such determinations re-
mains with the State in the absence of criteria established at
the international level and applied by an impartial, interna-
tional body. Though this may protect the accused from expo-
106 See Letter of Janet G. Mullins, supra note 60, at 5, which states, ". . . we
have become increasingly skeptical about whether achieving consensus on the nu-
merous issues associated with the establishment of such a court would ever be
possible..." See also TESTIMONY oF EDwn4 D. WuIAmSoN, supra note 50, at 4.
107 See TEsTImoNY OF EDWIN D. WLumAMoN, supra note 50, at 3.
108 Supra note 104.
109 Article 28 provides that States parties requested to hand over an accused to
the court are required to ensure that "[tihe proceedings have not been instituted on
political, racial, social or religious grounds." U.N. GAOR, supra note 35, at 28,
para. 2(a).
110 Thiam, supra note 34, at 29.
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sure to politicized international judicial proceedings, it is an
instance where the authority of the court is undermined in or-
der to address Member State concerns, perhaps in an unneces-
sarily detrimental way.
A related problem concerns the selection of judges to serve
on the court."' The Commission's proposal calls for the selec-
tion of a chamber of judges from a pool or 'General Assembly of
Judges', to hear cases brought to the court. Each State party
would be allowed to appoint one judge" 2 to the General Assem-
bly of Judges," 3 which would in turn nominate a president and
vice-president of the court to attend to the court's administra-
I11 Articles 12 and 15 address the appointment of judges and the composition
of the court. Thiam, supra note 34, at 18, para. 65, art. 12, and at 19, para. 73, art.
15.
112 Art. 12, U.N. GAOR, supra note 35, at 18, para. 65. Article 11 of the Rap-
porteur's draft statute determines the qualifications required of members of the
court, and specifies that they must be ". . . jurisconsults of high moral character
and recognized competence in international law and, more specifically, interna-
tional criminal law." U.N. GAOR, supra note 35, at 18, para. 64. This would oblige
States parties to appoint judges based on apolitical criteria. However, it would
neither give individual States parties much sanction over the composition of the
General Assembly of Judges nor of the specific chambers of the court. Article 17
allows for the removal ofjudges by the unanimous opinion of the other member of
the General Assembly of Judges. U.N. GAOR, supra note 35, at 21, para. 84. It is
thus theoretically possible, presuming the following States become parties to the
coures statute, for an American citizen to be tried by a chamber of judges which
included jurists from 'rouge' nations such as Iran, North Korea, China, Iraq and
Libya. It is important to note that the U.S., or another State party, could simply
not allow the trial of one of its nationals, thereby avoiding this circumstance. How-
ever, this would significantly undermine the court's potential and may doom it to
failure. A better approach might be to solve such technical problems in a manner
that would guarantee the non-politicization of proceedings before the court and the
court's authority to take cases in controversial and important instances. This
guarantee may allow the establishment of a permanent court with more extensive
jurisdiction.
113 This body would have few official functions and would exercise the author-
ity to elect the president and vice-president of the court and remove judges by
unanimous decision. It possesses a similar role to the 'Standing Committee' sug-
gested in Bassiouni's draft statute, with the exception that the Standing Commit-
tee would not necessarily consist ofjudges but merely State party representatives.
The Standing Committee would also have the prerogative to ". . . propose to State
Parties international instruments to enhance the functions of the Tribunal." BAs-
sIouNI, supra note 16, at 72, para. 2(h). This would apparently allow the Standing
Committee to propose new international legal instruments, additional protocols or
definitions to be added to the tribunal's jurisdiction. See M. CHERur BAssIoula,
DRAFr STATUTE, INT'L CRImNAL TRIBUNAL, ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL DE DROrr
PENAL, at 72, Art. 18, para. 2(h) (1992).
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five tasks.114 The president would have the authority to choose
the composition of a chamber of nine judges which could hear
cases before the court.115 The president thus has wide control
over the composition of the sitting chambers. 116
This power, however, is tempered by the prerogative of the
General Assembly of Judges to select a president and vice-presi-
dent by an absolute majority of votes, 1 7 thus indirectly al-
lowing the judges as a whole to oversee that chambers are not
stacked for political reasons. Judges could simply remove the
president if it becomes apparent that the composition of a cham-
ber is being influenced by political considerations. However,
this may be little assurance to States parties that chambers will
be assembled without political implications. States parties
would have no direct influence over the composition of the
court's chambers. States would have to rely on the appointment
process to deliver competent, impartial jurists; this provides no
guarantee that certain nationals will not be represented in
chambers trying their nationals. States might only be left with
the choice of not refering cases to the court, an option, if exer-
cised, that would have detrimental implications for the court
and its evolution into a body with compulsory authority. Thus,
the resolution of this issue, in a manner that would assure the
non-politicization of the court, is important with respect to the
degree of confidence States will yield to a permanent interna-
tional criminal jurisdiction. The Rapporteur's solution to this
problem probably would not allow Member States to place sig-
nificant or compulsory authority in the court on a permanent
basis.
A final concern regarding the court's scope is its subject
matter jurisdiction. The court's applicable law, as indicated in
the Rapporteur's draft statute, would include conventional in-
ternational law. 1 8 The crimes and specifications within the
114 U.N. GAOR, supra note 34, at 19, para. 69, art. 13.
115 See Thiam, supra note 34, at 7, para. 8; and U.N. GAOR, supra note 78, at
19, art. 41.
116 Thiam, supra note 34, at 19, para. 73.
117 U.N. GAOR, supra note 78, at 19, art. 41.
118 U.N. GAOR, supra note 78, at 10, para. 5. Article 4 thus reads, 'The Court
shall apply international conventions and agreements relevant to the crimes
within its jurisdiction (as well as general principles of law and custom).. ." U.N.
GAOR, supra note 34, at 10, art. 3.
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court's jurisdiction would be defined either in an additional
agreement or in the Commission's draft Criminal Code, if and
when it is ratified." 9 It is not likely that the court will be tied
to the draft code in any meaningful way, but will find its subject
matter jurisdiction in treaties in force and subsequent agree-
ments. The body of international criminal law within the
court's purview requires further attention, definition and agree-
ment. This is a source of ongoing concern to Member States ob-
servant of both the draft code and the proposed court. If the
proposed court is limited to subject matter that does not include
the most significant criminal acts, such as State aggression and
human rights violations, it may engender less controversy and
resistance, yet fail to address the problems that form the main
impetus behind the establishment of an international criminal
court.
One of the initial criteria suggested by the U.S. in assessing
the proposed court is the utility' 20 of a new international
court.12 The proposal to establish an international criminal ju-
risdiction has been advanced to address gaps in the present sys-
tem of international criminal law enforcement. 122  As
mentioned above, recent proposals have been directed at spe-
cific types of international crime or at a range of non-controver-
119 U.N. GAOR, supra note 78, at 11, art. 34. Problems associated with the use
of existing international criminal conventions, the definition of crimes therein, and
the viability of the draft Code of Crimes were specifically raised by the U.S. Mis-
sion to the UN in commentary on these projects. See Report of the United States on
the Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 1, and Comments of Governments on the Re-
port of the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 1, at 25. These reports note that international instruments
establishing crimes under international law have, in most cases, presumed trial in
national courts, that the draft code of crimes is vague and seriously flawed and
that the crimes enunciated in international conventions and the draft code lack the
requisite specificity to allow trial of an alleged at the international level without
violation of the principles nulla poena sine lege and nullem crimen sine lege.
120 Though an empirical assessment of the need for added mechanisms to en-
force international criminal law is an important aspect in the determination of the
utility of an international criminal court, and the efficacy of the various options
related to the court's structure and jurisdiction, a more thorough consideration
must be dealt with elsewhere. For the purposes of this discussion, the existing
system, while evolving and not without numerous advantages, fails to address sig-
nificant problems that may be beyond unilateral or bilateral solution. See Civi-
letti, supra note 9, at 6-10(A-B.A. Report), 2-5(N.Y.S.BA_ Report). See generally
Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 13.
121 See Statement of Robert B. Rosenstock, supra note 1.
122 See Bassiouni, supra note 14; and Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 13.
[Vol. 6:121
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss1/13
SYMPOSIUM ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
sial criminal activities that do not implicate states or their
representatives. 123 More importantly, the initial proposal for a
permanent international criminal court was inspired by the
need to sanction the use of aggressive force as well as State di-
rected human rights violations on the international plane.
124
Thus, while any proposed statute for a new international mech-
anism to improve the enforcement of international criminal law
must address the problems and risks associated with its estab-
lishment, it must also be assessed in relation to the interna-
tional problems it is intended to solve. The evolutionary and
restricted approach reflected in the Commission Rapporteur's
draft statute and contemporary writings on the subject, may not
address significant international problems or substantially alle-
viate the risks associated with its creation.
Since the Rapporteur's proposal incorporates an optional
and concurrent jurisdictional system, an international court
based on such a limited approach would be unable to control
acts conducted by heads of State and government officials. This
conception would effectively relegate the court to less signifi-
cant criminal acts, though also of great importance to the inter-
national community, such as hijacking and smuggling that
involve private individuals. Further, the proposed institution
would not improve the development or the definition of interna-
tional criminal law. The Commission Rapporteur's draft stat-
ute would neither solve the important problem created by the
lack of adequate specification of international criminal law, nor
would it create a more effective procedure by which to create
new international criminal law.
Finally, the Rapporteur's draft statute does not guarantee
that judges from rogue nations will not sit in judgement of U.S.
citizens. In addition to these flaws, the Commission Rap-
porteur's proposal raises other significant issues, noted by offi-
cials of the U.S. government, which cannot be addressed here in
a manner comparable to their importance. 12 5 The focus here is
123 Supra notes 17 and 94.
124 The move to create a permanent international criminal court in the imme-
diate post-war period was driven largely by the international desire to address
State acts of aggression and genocide.
125 For an outline of specific questions raised by the proposed court, see Com-
ments of Governments on the Report of the Working Group on the Question of an
International Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1. The Department of State notes
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the underlying approach and its implications for the scope and
efficacy of the court.
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING A RESTRICTED APPROACH
The limited and restricted approach undertaken by the
Commission,126 echoed in current writings on the subject,127 is
apparently based on a number of assumptions, some of which
remain unscrutinized and may be specious. An attempt will be
made to identify and consider the assumptions that form the
basis of this restricted approach, and to suggest the implica-
tions of these assumptions, if they prove to be unfounded.
The first and most significant assumption underlying the
Commission's approach relates to perceptions of national sover-
eignty.128 It has been remarked, though not fully argued, that
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court
might significantly infringe upon the sovereignty of States par-
ties. If the court were given compulsory jurisdiction to try indi-
viduals for State sponsored crimes or other crimes of concern to
the international community, it follows that the court might in-
fringe upon national sovereignty. This assertion suggests a
narrow definition of sovereignty that may not be plausible or
"...it is clear that further consideration is required on how best to resolve many of
the difficult questions which it raises... ." Comments of Governments on the Re-
port of the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 1, at 27.
126 See Thiam, supra note 34; and Comments of Governments on the Report of
the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction,
supra note 1.
127 See Masur, supra note 17; Chase, supra note 17; Report on the Seminar on a
Code of Crimes and Universal Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 17; Mueller,
supra note 27; American Bar Association, supra note 19; and Civiletti, supra note
9.
12 James N. Rosenau, Sovereignty in a Turbulent World (May 3, 1992) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author). Rosenau argues, in a paper prepared
for presentation at the Conference on Sovereignty and Collective Intervention
sponsored by Dartmouth College and the United Nations University, May, 1992:
Given the ambiguous and contradictory understandings of sovereignty
in a rapidly changing world, it can easily be argued that the concept ought
to be abandoned and replaced by new, more elaborate analytic equipment
and a new, more appropriate vocabulary. That is, since the concept is under
siege by phenomena that do not fit readily under its traditional rubric, it is
misleading, to say the least, to continue using the concept as if its contents
were self-evident.
Id. at 3.
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realistic 29 in the present and increasingly interdependent in-
temational system.' 30 Further, it may be espoused that an in-
ternational criminal court with review jurisdiction over
individual actions, even those associated with acts of state,
would afford the same protections and responsibilities as those
presently existing under national jurisdictions. Thus, state sov-
ereignty, broadly defined, may not be significantly impacted by
a court with extensive jurisdiction. If traditional definitions of
sovereignty remain relevant,' 3 ' it will be important to question
whether an international criminal court would impact sover-
eignty as it presently exists. The increasing recognition of the
individual under international law may suggest the waning of
State sovereignty.'3 2
The second assumption that should be considered is the ar-
gument that states would not accept the infringement of tradi-
tional sovereignty. This assertion is often referred to as
indisputable in any discussion of new authority for interna-
tional organizations.' 3 3 Significantly, as indicated in state-
ments by Member State Represntatives in the Sixth
Committee, some States are prepared to support the creation of
an international criminal jurisdiction with compulsory or exclu-
sive authority. 34 This support, and the reasons behind it, de-
129 See CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNrY: CAN THE UN KEEP PACE? 7,8
(The Stanley Foundation, ed., 1992).
130 See Boutras Boutras-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 72 FoREIGN
AFFAIRS 89 (1993).
131 See Statement of M. CherifBassiouni Before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, (May 12, 1993), in which he argues that a narrow definition of sov-
ereignty may be counter to national interests. Louis Henkin argues, "It is time to
bring sovereignty down to earth; to examine, analyze, reconceive the concept, cut it
down to size, break out its normative content, repackage it, perhaps even rename
it." Notes From the President: The Mythology of Sovereignty, AM. Soc'Y OF INTL L.,
March-May 1993, at 6. Rosenau poses the question thusly, ... . is the relative
balance between the sovereign rights of states and those of their international or-
ganizations presently undergoing transformation and, if so, at what pace toward
which extreme of the sovereignty continuum?" Rosenau, supra, note 128, at 6.
132 Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Indi-
viduals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
133 See generally ISISC Report, supra note 9, at 16. As Rosenau notes "...our
imaginations are paralyzed by the sovereignty concept... ." Rosenau, supra, note
128, at 4.
134 A number of Member States argued for the establishment of a more elabo-
rate court in the Sixth Committee's 1992 session, U.N. GAOR, supra note 30; and
United Nations, General Assembly, Forty-Seventh Session, Provisional Verbatim
Record of the 12th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.12 (1992).
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serve adequate consideration before the conclusion is reached
that a court with wide authority cannot gain Member State sup-
port. Even if one accepts the validity of traditional definitions
of state sovereignty, states may still yield jurisdiction over in-
ternational crime to a permanent and well conceived interna-
tional ciminal court.
This support has also been observed in the Commission.
Though it appears that the majority of the Commission favors a
court with limited authority and an evolutionary approach, 3 5 it
may neither reflect the opinions of the Commission as a whole
nor represent Member State interests. If the Commission's ap-
proach is based on the potentially false assumption that States
will not accept an infringement of sovereignty, then careful
scrutiny of this assumption is of considerable importance to the
eventual scope of the project. Some members of the Commis-
sion and UN member states favor a more elaborate approach
than that endorsed by the Commission as a whole.' 36
The assupmtion that Member State publics are concerned
with the infringement of national sovereignty forms the third
basis for the Commission's approach. In fact, there seems to be
increasing indication that publics would prefer greater scrutiny
of national governments by organs at the international level.
There is some indication that individuals support the establish-
ment of an international criminal court with the authority to
try persons for State sanctioned acts that violate international
criminal law.' 37 Especially in countries with non-representa-
135 See Report of the Working Group on the Question of an International Crimi-
nal Jurisdiction, supra note 15, paras. 9-32.
136 A number of UN member states strongly encourage establishment of a
court with broad authority.
137 See ALAN F. KAY, STANLEY B. GREENBERG, FREDRICK T. STEEPER & HAZEL
HENDERSON, GLOBAL UNCERTAINTIES, SuRvEY #21, AMERcANs TALK IssuEs, May
10, 1993; and ALAN F. KAY & HAZEL HENDERSON, STRUCTURES FOR GLOBAL Gov-
ERNANCE, SURVEY #23, AMRICANS TALK IssusS, May 10, 1993. The latter survey
report notes:
The support... for amending the UN charter to create an International
Criminal Court is both extremely high and extremely resistant to counter
arguments. Creation of such a court with the authority to try terrorists and
hijackers was favored by 82% five years ago in May of 1988. In this survey,
supermajoriies of 83%..., 82%.. ., and 87%... are in favor of the UN, with
due process of law, arresting individuals, including heads of state, accused
of certain serious crimes and trying them before an International Criminal
Court. Crimes which 78% or more of Americans agree should be placed
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five regimes, it should not be assumed that official government
positions can represent the will of the people. 138
Fourthly, the move to establish an international criminal
court with limited jurisdiction assumes that a court with op-
tional jurisdiction will address questions of significance to the
international community. As mentioned above, the creation of
a court with limited jurisdiction effectively excludes a number
of important criminal activities from its purview, most notably
those related to acts of state. An assessment of the court's po-
tential impact on other areas of international criminality, such
as drug trafficking and terrorist crimes, must also be pursued.
It has been argued that initial consideration should be given to
the court's utility. 39
The fifth assertion deals with the issue of whether a court
with optional jurisdiction will sufficiently address less signifi-
cant crimes and thereby gain the confidence of State parties. It
is therefore assumed that a restricted court will evolve into an
institution with wider authority, encompassing the more con-
troversial acts that may come under the court's authority. In
this view, a restricted approach would eventually yield an inter-
national criminal court that addresses acts such as State ag-
gression. The acceptance of a court that relies on subsequent
State recognition of its jurisdiction, it is argued, will bring the
international community one step closer to the establishment of
an international court with the recognized authority to rule on
acts of more substantial concern. 140 This may prove to be false
gradualism if the court is not given the authority to address
more important criminal activities, and if it fails to convince
under the court's jurisdiction include seriously damaging the global environ-
ment, invading and occupying a neighboring country, and serious human
rights violation..... When it was stated that it is conceivable that a Presi-
dent of the U.S. might someday be arrested by the UN under the charter
revision creating an International Criminal Court, support for the court nev-
ertheless remains 78%... and 86%... (emphasis in original).
STRUCTURES FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, SURvEY #23, supra, at 7.
138 There are people who argue that the court will require the surrender of
national sovereignty to an international tribunal, which must be critically as-
sessed before the court's authority and jurisdiction are decided.
139 Scharf, supra note 9; and Comments of Governments on the Report of the
Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction, supra
note 1.
140 U.N. GAOR, supra note 15, at 13-14.
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Member States of its ability to enforce international criminal
law where less significant crimes are concerned.
The sixth assumption regarding the proposed court, under-
lying the call for a restricted, evolutionary approach, suggests
that other mechanisms will address the more significant
problems plaguing the international community. The continued
reliance on unilateral and multilateral ad hoc solutions may be
insufficient to address acts of State aggression and violations of
human rights, or may appear illegitimate, arbitrary and self-
serving. Greater reliance on the Security Council in recent cri-
ses would seem to support this assumption, yet the Council may
not have the will or the resources to solve the many problems
related to international criminal activity that presently evade
solution by individual Member States or the international
community.
The above noted assumptions, where accepted without suf-
ficient scrutiniy, lead many to conclude that a permanent court
with restricted authority will effectively address international
concerns, develop into a more credible and powerful institution,
and gain the acceptance of the international community. Fur-
ther, the reasoning behind these assumptions, especially those
related to sovereignty, suggests that the only court acceptable
to Member States and their constituencies would possess
merely limited jurisdiction. Traditional conceptions of State
sovereignty, the conviction that such concerns are still widely
held, and the perceived impact an authoritative permanent
court may have, make consideration of a more elaborate ap-
proach incomprehensible for many in the U.S. and elsewhere.
However, it may be the case that a more extensive proposal,
perhaps similar to the one outlined below, would address not
only the more egregious international criminal problems, but
also resolve concerns related to its establishment.
THE MuLATERAL APPROACH
A minilateral approach, 141 involving those Member States
willing to accept a permanent court with compulsory and exclu-
sive jurisdiction, that would incorporate democratic principles
141 For a consideration of multilateral vs. minilateral collective action
problems, see Miles Kahler, Multilateralism With Small and Large Numbers, 46
INT'L ORGANMIzATON 681 (1992).
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and the development of international criminal law, and which
would integrate the proposed court into the Security Council's
mandate, may allow for the establishment of an international
court with greater authority. Importantly, such an approach
may address the more substantial concerns outlined by Ameri-
can officials. Though the minflateral conception outlined here
is in contradiction to the prevailing approach and the assump-
tions underlying it, a restricted court would not, by definition,
address State acts such as aggression and genocide; whereas a
minilateral approach, incorporating compulsory jurisdiction,
may provide the institutional means to sanction State con-
ducted criminal activity.
The lack of a complete and specific body of international
criminal law could be overcome if a permanent court, that al-
lowed for the subsequent definition of criminal law by a General
Assembly of Judges, were established. Giving this Assembly
the authority to define international crimes, such as those
found in treaties in force and, perhaps, based on UN General
Assembly resolutions, 142 would create international criminal
law of adequate specificity to form the basis of an international
criminal trial. The definition of international criminal law ema-
nating from an international source, rather than from a series
of bilateral or multilateral agreements, may have greater legiti-
macy, and provide swifter response, then the present system of
international criminal law creation. Additionally, were the Se-
curity Council given some role in creating new or more fully de-
fined international criminal law, perhaps by a vote of the
Council or an appointed sub-council employing modified voting
and procedural rules, the resultant corpus of international
criminal law would have greater authority and respect. This
would acknowledge the prerogative and power realities of the
Security Council, which might be called upon to enforce the
court's rulings, and allow for the further definition of interna-
tional criminal law through the General Assembly of Judges.
The appointment of judges to the court's Assembly could
also be modified to assure States parties that the law defined by
142 On the impact of General Assembly resolutions on international law, see
Christopher C. Joyner, U-N General Assembly Resolutions and International Law:
Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation, 11 CAL. W. INTL L. J.
445 (1981).
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this body would be democratic, 143 and that the judges selected
to hear cases would be from countries with representative sys-
tems of government. Where States parties practice democracy,
the judges of this Assembly could be directly appointed by gov-
ernments, in the same manner as that outlined in the Commis-
sion Rapporteur's proposal.144 However, where States parties
to the court's statute do not have a legitimate electoral process,
their representatives to the General Assembly of Judges would
be chosen by direct election. 145 This may offer an incentive to
Member States to move toward national elections, while resolv-
ing the problem of judges from non-democratic States trying
U.S. citizens.
A final benefit of this approach relates to the enforcement
of the court's rulings. A court, trying criminal acts based on
well defined law that the Council had a role in creating, would
have greater authority. The problem of respect for the court's
authority, and the illegitimacy associated with the unilateral
enforcement of international criminal law, would thus be obvi-
ated by the incorporation of the Council. The Council, as men-
tioned, would more likely move to sanction violations of
international criminal law it had a hand in creating.
Thus, a more authoritative court, incorporating the demo-
cratic enunciation of new and more clearly defined interna-
tional criminal law, as well as a means of certifying judges
appointed to the court and the authority of the Security Coun-
cil, could address the problems implicit in the creation of an
international criminal jurisdiction. If the assumptions underly-
ing the contemporary approach are reassessed, a more elabo-
rate court, which would address State sanctioned criminal acts
and problems associated with the creation of an international
criminal jurisdiction, may be possible.
143 See generally, BUILDING A MoREI DaEocRATic UNTED NATIONS, (Frank Bar-
naby, ed., 1991).
I" Thiam, supra note 34, at 18, para. 65, art. 12(a).
145 The legitimacy of the electoral process might be certified by the UN. See
Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. INA' L.
46 (1992).
[Vol. 6:121
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss1/13
SYMPOSIUM ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
CONCLUSION
The position of the U.S. toward the proposed international
criminal court can be characterized as cautious and indiffer-
ent.146 While some organs of the federal government have ad-
vocated support for the project under consideration at the UN,
others have expressed outright opposition to the establishment
of a permanent court.1 47 The executive branch has given some
attention to the problems raised by the proposal and, at the urg-
ing of Congress, has outlined a number of unresolved complexi-
ties surrounding the court.' 48  Academics and non-
governmental organizations have given support and attention
to the effort, consistently voicing a positive attitude toward the
proposed court, by offering draft statutes and reports, and lob-
bying officials in Washington and New York. Despite the com-
pletion of a number of reports on the subject, there has not been
an official American attempt to comprehensively solve the
many problems identified by the U.S., international legal schol-
ars and the International Law Commission. The leadership on
the most recent draft statute has come from the UN. The Amer-
ican public,149 while hardly well informed on the subject, may
be more supportive of the concept then recent U.S. participation
would indicate.
Recent efforts to create a permanent court, and U.S. com-
mentary thereon, have focused on a court with limited jurisdic-
tion and authority.' 50 The current consensus, both in the U.S.
and the Commission, appears to endorse a court restricted in its
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. This approach is
based on a number of assumptions related to national sover-
eignty and the complexities implicit in the creation of a new in-
ternational criminal law enforcement mechanism.
Significantly, it is assumed that a court with more than op-
146 Ferencz, supra note 4, at 387.
147 For a discussion of opposition to the court, see supra notes 46-49 and accom-
panying text. Congress has been most inclined to endorse the concept.
148 For a discussion of these problems, see generally Judicial Conference Re-
port, supra note 1; Comments of Governments on the Report of the Working Group
on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1; Scharf,
supra note 9; and Ferencz, supra note 4, at 387-390.
149 See supra note 137.
150 For commentary on the proposed court, see supra note 1. For a discussion
of proposals for the establishment of the proposed court, see supra note 17.
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tional jurisdiction will infringe upon Member State sovereignty
or pose insurmountable risks to the present system of interna-
tional criminal law enforcement. These assumptions, while as-
sociated with important considerations, are seldom adequately
assessed and militate against the consideration of a court with
the authority to try acts of aggression and State sanctioned
human rights violations.
However, the problems associated with the establishment
of an international criminal court which relate to the degree of
State support for the project, may also exist in a court with lim-
ited jurisdiction, perhaps even to a greater degree. Thus, ab-
sent the inclination to consider a more comprehensive proposal
and thoroughly resolve the complexities such a court would in-
volve, a compromise, restricted approach may neither address
the most pressing and tragic problems in the international sys-
tem, nor receive adequate scrutiny to assure that it is without
significant flaws.
It has been argued here that the establishment of a perma-
nent court with compulsory jurisdiction, incorporating demo-
cratic principles, an improved system of international criminal
law definition, and the authority of the UN Security Council
would better address the concerns of the international commu-
nity. Such an approach may also allow for the incorporation of
mechanisms which alleviate the dangers associated with the es-
tablishment of an international criminal jurisdiction. If the as-
sumptions forming the basis of the current effort are
reassessed, a permanent court with the authority to compel cen-
sure of serious violations of international criminal law may be
possible and may better serve the international community and
the U.S.
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